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1970] COMMENTS
many cases lead to unnecessarily large verdicts, working an un-
justifiable hardship on the defendant.
Paul H. Spaht
RESTRICTIONS ON MANAGEMENT RIGHTS-
UNION NEGOTIATION WAIVER
The National Labor Relations Act grants employees the
right of self-organization' and provides an elaborate machinery
for safeguarding that right by guaranteeing "laboratory" con-
ditions for the election of a collective-bargaining representative.2
If, after an unhampered decision, a majority of employees in
the appropriate unit designate a representative, the employer
is required to bargain with that representative concerning wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment3 until a
contract is concluded and reduced to writing, if one of the parties
should request it, 4 or until an impasse is reached. The Act im-
poses upon employer and union alike the duty to bargain in
1. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964):
"Sec. 7. Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing . . . and shall also have the right to refrain from any
or all of such activities.
The collective bargaining system as encouraged by Congress, admin-
istered by the Board, and enforced by the judiciary, of necessity subordi-
nates the interest of individual employees to collective interests of all em-
ployees in the appropriate unit. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). The con-
stitutionality of the act was upheld in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
2. The Board in General Shoe Corp. 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 126-27 (1948) wrote:
"An election can serve its true purpose only if surrounding conditions
enable employees to register a free and untrammeled choice for or against
a bargaining representative. . . . In election proceedings, it is the Board's
function to provide a laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted,
under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited
desires of the employees. It is our duty to establish those conditions; it is
also our duty to determine whether they have been fulfilled."
3. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964):
"Sec. 9. (a) Representatives designated or selected for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate
for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees
in such suit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to the rates
of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment . .. ."
4. A refusal to sign is a refusal to bargain collectively and is an unfair
labor practice: section 8(a) (5). H. J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514
(1941).
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good faith with the terms of agreement left to the parties. 5 Board
policy assures participants that the Board will determine whether
there has been collective bargaining but will not decide the
terms to be included in the contract.0 However, this original state-
ment of non-intervention has been undermined by the NLRB
and the courts. Decisions have described subject matter of col-
lective agreements as bargainable or non-bargainable, and if
5. The duty to bargain collectively: "Sec. 8(a). It shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer-(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with
the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of Section
9(a)." National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1964).
See Section 8(b) (3) for union duty to bargain collectively. Labor-Management
Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (3) (1964).
The obligation to bargain in good faith: "See. 8(d). For the purposes
of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual
obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to . . . the execu-
tion of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested
by either party, but such obligations does not compel either party to agree
to a proposal or require the making of concession: Provided, That where
there is in effect a collective-bargaining contract covering employees in an
industry affecting commerce, the duty to bargain collectively shall also
mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such con-
tract . . . ." National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
(1964). The purpose of section 8(a) in making an unfair labor practice the
refusal of an employer to bargain collectively with employee representatives
effectuates management's duty to recognize the union; management's duty
to bargain in good faith is a corollary of its duty to recognize. Similarly,
one purpose of section 8(b) Is to insure that unions will approach the bar-
gaining table with the same attitude of willingness to reach an agreement
that is required of management. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union,
361 U.S. 477 (1960). See also Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. NLRB, 387 F.2d
542 (4th Cir. 1967). Of significance infra is the Supreme Court's comparison
of the NLRA's duty to bargain with that of the Railway Labor Act: "It
[the Railway Act] was taken 'to prohibit the negotiation of labor contracts
generally applicable to employees' in the described unit with any other rep-
resentative than the one so chosen, 'but not as precluding such individual
contracts' as the Company might 'elect to make directly with individual
employees.' We think this construction also applies to § 9(a) of the National
Labor Relations Act.
"The Act does not compel agreements between employers and employees.
It does not compel any agreement whatever. It does not prevent the em-
ployer 'from refusing to make a collective contract and hiring individuals
on whatever terms' the employer 'may by unilateral action determine.'"
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937).
6. The substantive terms of the labor-management contract are to be
forged by the parties to it, not by the Board. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 73
L.R.R.M. 2561 (1970). United Steelworkers of America v. NLRB, 389 F.2d
295 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See Wellington, Freedom of Contract and the Collective
Bargaining Agreement, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 467, 469-77 (1964). See also NLRB
v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960) and NLRB v. American
National Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952). "Hard bargaining" on mandatory
subjects is not prohibited. See NLRB v. Cummer-Graham Co., 279 F.2d 575
(5th Cir. 1960).
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discussion is not foreclosed, i.e. bargainable, as either compul-
sory or permissive.
The area with which this Comment deals may be best illus-
trated by an example of a common industrial situation. An em-
ployer has given Christmas "gifts" to his employees for many
years, but be notifies the workers that he is unable to do so this
year. A union agent registers a complaint and requests the em-
ployer to bargain over his decision. Without consulting the union,
the employer fails to include the bonus in his employees' year-
end paychecks. Rather than follow the grievance procedure
which may have been established in the contract, the union
files a refusal-to-bargain charge with the Board. Under an "exist-
ing benefits" clause in the contract or as part of the actual
working conditions of the employees the well-intentioned em-
ployer may find that his unilateral action violated the labor
statute and will face a Board order requiring him to pay the
benefits due. It is the purpose of this Comment to examine why
the employer finds himself in this predicament, how he may
escape it, and how he may prevent another such dilemma from
occurring.
7. A subject is "bargainable" if employers and unions either may or
must bargain collectively upon it at the request of the other party. "Non-
bargainable" subjects are those about which collective bargaining Is fore-
closed either because they must be included, upon request, or because they
may not be included in the contract. See, e.g., Montgomery Ward & Co., 37
N.L.R.B. 100 (1941), recognition is not a bargainable issue once the election
results in the union's certification; it must be included. Carroll v. Local 802,
AFM, 372 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1967), vacated on other grounds, 391 U.S. 99
(1968), price fixing generally is a subject toward which union activity may
not be directed without violating antitrust laws. Bargainable topics may
be compulsory, see, e.g., Caroline Farms, Div. of Textron, Inc. v. NLRB,
401 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1968) (union security is a mandatory subject); Allied
Chemical Corp., 151 N.L.R.B. 718 (1965) (the Board has not required em-
ployers to bargain concerning all subcontracting decisions).
In determining whether or not a given matter should be deemed a man-
datory subject of collective bargaining, the Board and the courts recognize
a legal distinction between those subjects which have a material or signifi-
cant impact upon wages, hours, or other conditions of employment, and
those which are related only indirectly or incidentally to those subjects.
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 387 F.2d 542 (4th Cir. 1967). The
classification of subjects as terms or conditions of employment is a matter
concerning which the Board has special expertise. NLRB v. Local 1082,
IHC, 384 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. den'd, 309 U.S. 920 (1968). As a result
of this distinction each party has a right in labor negotiations to present,
even repeatedly, demands concerning non-mandatory subjects of bargaining,
so long as each does not posit the matter as an ultimatum. Section 8(a)(5)
prohibits only a party's insistence to point of impasse upon non-mandatory
proposals so that acceptance of the proposal becames a condition precedent
to accepting any collective bargaining agreement. Local 3-89, OCAW v.
NLRB, 405 F.2d 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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Union Advantages
Management traditionally has felt that the labor contract
secured to the union and employees a limited number of defined
rights which were deviations from the "once-absolute preroga-
tives" of the employer. "The powers which management does
not surrender by the contract, it [has been] asserted, manage-
ment necessarily retains and may exercise unilaterally.",, This
view, however, is tenuous in the face of numerous Board and
court decisions restricting management's prerogatives and in
the light of the fact that problems of mandatory bargaining
subjects extend past contract negotiations and actual contract
signingY The collective agreement has been likened to a con-
stitution by which basic principles governing employer-employee
conduct are stated and by which their conduct should be mea-
sured.10 This contract contains the overt agreements and prob-
ably much more. Within its umbrage fall questions arising dur-
ing negotiations which were not included in the final draft and
problems concerning the employment situation about which the
parties were silent during negotiations. Just as unilateral action
during negotiations prior to an impasse is rejected by the Act,1
8. Cox and Dunlop, The Duty to Bargain Collectively During the Term
of an Existing Agreement, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1117 (1950). See also Wol-
lett, The Duty to Bargain Over the "Unwritten" Terms and Conditions of
Employment, 36 TEXAS L. REV. 863 (1958).
9. The execution of a collective contract does not end the process of
collective bargaining. The interpretation and administration of a pre-
viously-executed contract and the settlement of disputes arising under any
such contract are properly regarded as within the sphere of collective bar-
gaining. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); United Steelworkers of
America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steel-
workers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960);
Century Papers, Inc., 155 N.L.R.B. 358 (1965); Huttig Sash & Door Co.,
154 N.L.R.B. 811 (1965), enf'd 377 F.2d 964 (8th Cir. 1967); Jacobs Mfg.
Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951), enf'd, 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952); Tidewater
Associated Oil Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1096 (1949); Consolidated Aircraft Corp.,
47 N.L.R.B. 694 (1943); Lone Star Gas Co., 18 N.L.R.B. 420 (1939).
10. Cox and Dunlop, The Duty to Bargain Collectively During the Term
of an Existing Agreement, 63 HARv. L. REV. 1097 (1950).
11. Sections 8(a)(5) and (d) have long been construed to require the
employer to refrain from acting unilaterally during negotiations to change
conditions of employment, NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962). See also
Korn Indus., Inc. v. NRLB, 389 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1967), employer violates
duty to bargain collectively when it institutes changes in subjects of man-
datory-bargaining without first consulting the union. In this respect, uni-
lateral changes are so disruptive to the collective bargaining relationship
that they violate the Act without any evidence of subjective bad faith.
NLRB v. Consolidated Rendering Co., 386 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1967). How-
ever, once the parties are in a position of deadlock, there is considerable
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such action during the term of the agreement is suspect. In both
situations unilateral action endangers Section 7 rights because
it subverts the elected representative and is an unfair labor
practice if it affects items listed in Section 9 (a) 12 when not
otherwise excused. Yet, obviously the employer is interested
in having great leeway to conduct his business, and if he must
suffer limitations he would much prefer having them written
and readily accessible. 3 Nevertheless, he realizes that to cover
specifically every aspect of the working relationship, the agree-
ment would be voluminous and this soon would be inadequate
as a result of changes made necessary to maintain a competitive
posture.
The original Wagner Act was interpreted to require bar-
gaining over items already agreed upon and incorporated into
the contract.14 That pre-Taft-Hartley view is now no longer
possible, since the duty to bargain is not required for any modi-
fication of terms "contained in the contract" for a stated period.15
In Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB,' 6 the Sixth Circuit ex-
plicity held that "the duty to bargain ... may be channeled and
directed by contractual agreement'" and reasoned that there
is no duty to bargain outside of the framework established in
the agreement. Two years later this decision favoring manage-
latitude for management action. NLRB v. Tex-Tan, Inc., 318 F.2d 472
(5th Cir. 1963). See also NLRB v. United States Sonics Corp., 312 F.2d 610
(1st Cir. 1963); NLRB v. United Nuclear Corp., 381 F.2d 972 (10th Cir. 1967).
12. See note 3 supra. In May Department Stores v. NLRB, 326 U.S.
376 (1945), a case in which the employer refused to bargain in order to
obtain judicial review of the appropriateness of the bargaining unit and
unilaterally requested permission from the War Labor Board to raise the
wages of all its employees. The Supreme Court in affirming the Board's
finding of interference and a refusal to bargain, expressed the general
philosophy concerning unilateral action under these circumstances by stating:
"Employer action to bring about changes . . . without consultation . . .
cannot, we think, logically or realistically, be distinguished from bargaining
with individuals or minorities ..... Such unilateral action minimizes the
influence of organized bargaining. It interferes with the right of self-
organization by emphasizing to the employees that there is no necessity for a
collective bargaining agent." Id. at 384-385. Accord, e.g., Reed & Prince
Mfg. Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 850 (1951), enf'd, 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 887 (1953).
13. Management desires limitations in writing for two reasons: (a) it
will only be confined to those limitations about which it has negotiated and
to which it has applied its economic power; and (b) administration of busi-
ness is simpler when it is limited by only explicit statements.
14. See, e.g., Alexander Milburn Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 482, 510 (1945); United
States Automatic Corp., 57 N.L.R.B. 124, 133 (1944); Carroll's Transfer Co.,
56 N.L.R.B. 935, 937 (1943).
15. See note 5 supra.
16. 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947).
17. Id. at 955.
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ment was weakened by a Board decision, Tidewater Associated
Oil Co.' s The unanimous Board held that the pertinent Section
8(d) language referred only to "terms and conditions which
have been integrated and embodied in writing." This interpre-
tation does not allow the employer, or union, to decline a re-
quest to discuss bargainable issues not embodied in the con-
tract.19
Once Tidewater was decided, one objection remained to the
propriety of a union seeking NLRB assistance by filing an
8(a) (5) unfair labor practice charge. That argument was that
the Board should withhold the exercise of its jurisdiction in the
case of unilateral action because a resolution of the issues re-
quires an interpretation of the contract. Thus, at most, the ob-
jectionable conduct is a breach of the collective bargaining
agreement which might subject the employer to a suit under
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act,20 and in-
terpretation by the Board would interfere with the machinery
established by the parties to settle their grievances through arbi-
tration.2 1 Such a view was forcefully urged in Square D. Co. v.
NLRB, 22 in which the employer had signed a union contract
which contained a grievance procedure ending with binding
arbitration. A dispute arose over the unilateral institution of
a group incentive plan and refusal to bargain over it. The com-
pany's position was that "since construction of the . . .contract
18. 85 N.L.R.B. 1096 (1949).
19. Only a slight change has varied this view-a defense (discussed in
depth infra) by the employer when the union files an 8(a)(5) charge. The
employer can counter the charge by urging that the union has waived its
post-contract bargaining rights to a particular term of employment. As a
result of this waiver the employer is entitled to make unilateral changes
without notifying or consulting with the employees' representative.
20. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. §
185(a) (1964) provides: "Suits for violation of contracts between an em-
ployer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry
affecting commerce as defined In this chapter, or between any such labor
organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction of the parties .... "
21. See Eaton Yale & Towne Inc., 171 N.L.R.B. No. 73 (1968); Thor Power
Tool Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 1379 (1964); Cloverleaf Div. of Adams Dairy Co.,
147 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1964); United Telephone Co. of the West, 112 N.L.R.B. 779
(1955); Crown Zellerbach Corp., 95 N.L.R.B. 753 (1951); Consolidated Air-
craft Corp., 47 N.L.R.B. 694 (1943). Extensive discussions of this may be
found in the following: Cox & Dunlop, The Duty to Bargain Collectively
During the Term of an Existing Agreement, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1101-10
(1950); Cushman, Arbitration and the Duty to Bargain, 1967 Wis. L. REV.
612; Jones, The Name of the Game is Decision-rome Reflections on "Arbitra-
bility" and "Authority" in Labor Arbitration, 46 TEXAS L. REV. 865 (1968);
Note, 41 IND. L. J. 455 (1966).
22. 332 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1964).
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is involved and since the contract provides for arbitration of
disputes respecting its construction, the meaning of the contract
in regard to the waiver for which the Company contends should
have been submitted to arbitration. ' 23 The Board had dismissed
the company's argument which would have preempted the
Board's jurisdiction and had ordered the employer to bargain.
In denying enforcement the Ninth Circuit wrote: "the existence
of an unfair labor practice here is dependent upon the resolution
of a preliminary dispute involving only the interpretation of
the contract. '24
Despite this decision, Board policy did not change and this
set the stage for three cases in 1967 which have determined sub-
sequent Board and Court action in the jurisdictional conflict. In
companion cases, NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp.25 and NLRB
v. Acme Industrial Co.,26 the Supreme Court settled the ques-
tion of the Board's power to interpret contracts where a con-
tractual clause is urged as a defense to an unfair labor practice
charge. The Court held that the Board had such authority. NLRB
v. Huttig Sash & Door Co.,27 decided by the Eighth Circuit, relied
on the Supreme Court's decisions and supported the Board's
holding that Huttig had violated section 8 (a) (5) of the Act. The
company had contended that its wage reduction plan was author-
ized by the agreement. The union was not obligated to agree to
any modification of the existing collective agreement and, having
failed to reach an accord, the company was not then at liberty
to modify unilaterally the terms and conditions of employment
during the life of the contract 28 without complying with the
23. Id. at 361.
24. Id. at 365-366.
25. 385 U.S. 421 (1967).
26. 385 U.S. 432 (1967).
27. 377 F.2d 964 (8th Cir. 1967).
28. C & S Indus., Inc., 158 N.L.R.B. 454, 457 (1966): "It is true, of course,
that where during timely negotiations for a new agreement an employer
has offered to bargain with a union concerning a proposed change in con-
tract conditions and the union has refused to bargain, the employer does
not violate his statutory obligation if following the effective period of the
expiring contract he unilaterally institutes the change. The situation is dif-
ferent .. . where .. . an employer seeks to modify during the life of an
existing contract terms and conditions of employment embodied in the con-
tract . . . . In the latter situation, a bargain having already been struck
for the contract period . . . neither party is required under the statute to
bargain anew about the matters the contract has settled for its duration,
and the employer is no longer free to modify the contract over the objection
of the Union." Accord, John W. Bolton & Sons, Inc., 91 N.L.R.B. 989 (1950),
involving a similar factual situation; Kinard Trucking Co., Inc., 152
N.L.R.B. 449 (1965).
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provisions of section 8 (d). The court held that the charge should
not be dismissed simply because Huttig's conduct, which was
outside "of the plain and unambiguous provisions of the con-
tract,"29 could have been challenged under the available griev-
ance-arbitration procedures. Thus, effect was given to section
10 (a) which states: "The Board is empowered . . . to prevent
any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice . . . .This
power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment
or prevention that has been or may be established by agree-
ment, law, or otherwise .... "30 Having frequently held that it
was not precluded from resolving an unfair labor practice issue
simply because as an incident of its inquiry it must construe
the scope of a contract which an arbitrator is also authorized
to construe,81 the Board since 1967 could do so with Supreme
Court approval. 2
A most obvious type of limitation is that which the parties
have bargained into the written agreement. Here an express
provision clearly may prohibit unilateral action. Another ex-
press provision of the contract may state specifically that the
status quo must be maintained. This "existing benefits" 33 clause
recognizes the impossibility of including every facet of the em-
29. 377 F.2d 964, 966 (8th Cir. 1967).
30. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a)
(1964).
31. See C & S Indus., Inc., 158 N.L.R.B. 454 (1966); Huttig Sash & Door
Co., Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. 811 (1965); Cloverleaf Div. of Adams Dairy Co., Inc.,
147 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1964); Smith Cabinet Mfg. Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1506 (1964);
Beacon Piece Dyeing & Finishing Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 953 (1958); John W.
Bolton & Sons, Inc., 91 N.L.R.B. 989 (1950). Deference may be given arbitra-
tion, See also McLean Trucking Co., 175 N.L.R.B. No. 66 (1969).
32. Leeds & Northrup Co. v. N.L.R.B., 391 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1968);
N.L.R.B. v. Tom Johnson, Inc., 378 F.2d 342 (9th Cir. 1967); Gravenslund
Operating Co., 168 N.L.R.B. No. 72 (1967).
33. This type of clause is a contractual method of assuring continued
enforcement of the actual working conditions whether or not they have been
reduced to writing. Two examples taken from NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co.,
211 F.2d 622, 624-25 (8th Cir. 1954) illustrate (a) a union-biased clause and
(b) an employer-biased clause: (a) "The Employer agrees that all condi-
tions of employment relating to wages, hours of work, overtime differentials,
and general working conditions shall be maintained at not less than the
highest minimum standards in effect at the time of the signing of this agree-
ment, and the conditions of employment shall be improved wherever spe-
cific provisions for improvement are made elsewhere in this agreement."
(Emphasis added.)
(b) "Maintenance of Standards. The Employer agrees that wages, hours
of work, and general working conditions shall be maintained at not less
than the highest minimum standards specified in this agreement and the
conditions of the employment shall be improved wherever specific provi-
sions for improvement are made elsewhere in this agreement." (Emphasis
added.)
COMMENTS
ployment condition in any single contract. The principle of
"existing benefits" is that the employer is bound by both ex-
press articles of the contract and those which were not expressly
included but which are actual terms of employment. An excel-
lent illustration of this principle is found in Nash-Finch Co.,34
where, prior to unionization, the employer was in the habit of
giving its employees with whom it had individual contracts,
year-end bonuses. The company explained to the employees that
if they selected a union to represent them, that benefit would
probably end. The union was certified despite this and other cam-
paign maneuvers, and during negotiations it proposed an exist-
ing benefits clause. A compromise was worked out during nego-
tiations that emasculated the union-proposed clause. The agree-
ment as signed contained no provision requiring the employer
to provide a Christmas bonus, and at year's end the company
paid none. The Board held that the company had violated
8 (a) (5) and that the union had not waived its right to bargain
concerning bonuses just because it had signed the contract. On
appeal, the Eighth Circuit denied enforcement on the grounds
that the changes in the "maintenance of standards" clause indi-
cated that the employees knew the company would no longer
pay Christmas bonuses. The court wrote:
"Where the parties to a contract have deliberately and vol-
untarily put their engagement in writing in such terms as
import a legal obligation without uncertainty as to the
obligation or extent of such engagement, it is conclusively
presumed that the entire engagement of the parties and the
extent and manner of their undertaking have been reduced
to writing. '35
This decision reflects a strict approach to interpreting labor con-
tracts. The absence of any existing benefits clause, rather than
just a weak one, did not seem persuasive to the Fifth Circuit
in General Telephone Co. of Florida v. NLRB.36 The court held,
in considering the employer's unilateral discontinuance of
Christmas checks, that although the contract actually signed
did not contain an existing benefits clause, this did not suggest
that the union meant to relinquish any right to bargain about
34. 103 N.L.R.B. 1695 (1953).
35. 211 F.2d 622, 626 (8th Cir. 1954). The Court refers to Ford v. Luria
Steel & Trading Corp., 192 F.2d 880, 884 (8th Cir. 1951), and cases cited
therein.
36. 337 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1964).
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bonuses nor could the employer reasonably deduce such an
intent. Unlike the Nash-Finch case the court in General Tele-
phone found that in the contract negotiations little or no refer-
ence was made to year-end checks and that "the Board properly
found on the evidence before it that the Union was not estopped
by its contract negotiations. '37
A significant recent Board decision, New Orleans Board of
Trade, Ltd.,38 affirms the idea that existing benefits clauses or
the lack of them must be construed in the context of what oc-
curred over the bargaining table. Another Christmas-bonus dis-
pute prompted the filing of this 8 (a) (5) charge. There the Board
held that the unilateral change was a failure to bargain over the
question of discontinuance, and it ordered payment. The decision
was lengthened only because of the objections raised by the dis-
sent. In answering the dissent, which was based upon the case
of Westinghouse Electric Corp. (Mansfield Plant),9 the majority
noted that the mere absence from the collective bargaining
agreement actually signed of an existing benefits clause did not
prove that the union meant to forego the right to bargain on
subsequent changes. No mention of bonuses was made in nego-
tiations in New Orleans board of Trade, whereas subcontracting
had been discussed in Westinghouse.
In the absence of an existing benefits clause the employer
may still be bound by terms not embodied in the contract. These
limitations are longstanding usages which may or may not have
received attention during the bargaining 0 and about which there
may or may not have been general agreement but which, for
some reason, were not included in the contract. In NLRB v.
Niles-Bement-Pond Co.,41 it was held that the Christmas bonuses,
though not written into the contract, in view of their regularity
over a substantial period of time (12 years), assumed the status
of wages. In his dissent to the Board decision, Member Murdock
questioned: "Does this [employee expectancy] mean that the
first year the employer gives a Christmas bonus there is no
37. Id. at 454.
38. 152 N.L.R.B. 1258 (1965).
39. 150 N.L.R.B. 1574 (1965).
40. An important consideration of whether the employer will be bound
by these long-standing practices is whether they were negotiated at the bar-
gaining table. This discussion, however, will be reserved because it is best
urged as a defense by the employer that the union has waived its rights
and is now estopped from requesting collective bargaining.
41. 199 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1952).
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expectancy. . . .Does the first bonus provide the necessary ex-
pectancy?" 42 The simplest test in determining the establishment
of an expectancy is whether regular payment over a number of
years in unvarying amounts48 not predicated on the company's
profit-loss sheet will tend to cause the year-end checks to be
considered part of the employee's earnings.44
An elementary principle of contract law is that the parties
must agree on the terms of the agreement before it is legally
binding.45 In some instances of unwritten long-standing usages
in labor relations, silence on the part of the employer will
effectively imply his assent.40 The case of Detroit & Toledo Shore-
line R.R. Co. v. United Transportation Union,47 an opinion by
Justice Black, involved the railroad's intention to establish "out-
lying work assignments" 4 which would require many employees
to report for work at Trenton rather than Lang Yard where they
had been reporting-the expense of transportation and time to
be borne by the employees. The union wanted to prevent the
railroad from unilaterally changing this condition of employ-
42. 97 N.L.R.B. 165, 171 (1951).
43. Where the gift varied in amount with each employee and differed
in amount from year to year, it was held not an integral part of wages and
therefore terminable at management's choice. Renart Sportswear Corp.,
6 Lab. Arb. 654 (1947). Accord, NLRB v. Wonder State Mfg. Co., 344 F.2d
210 (8th Cir. 1965), where there was no consistency or regularity in pay-
ment, there was no uniformity in or basis for amount, the bonuses were
considered not tied to remuneration received by employees. But see NLRB
v. Citizens Hotel Co., 326 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1964). A Christmas bonus given
for several years, although in varying amounts, was integral part of wages
and, as such, mandatory subject of bargaining with respect to discontinu-
ance.
44. See, e.g., Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 368
(6th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Zelrich Co., 344 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1965) (5 years
was sufficient); General Tel. Co. of Florida v. NLRB, 337 F.2d 452 (5th
Cir. 1964). See also Century Elec. Motors Co., 180 N.L.R.B. No. 174 (1970),
in which the Board held that a successor employer who paid a Christmas
bonus one year, his predecessor having paid it for nine years, could not dis-
continue unilaterally the Christmas bonus in subsequent years.
45. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 3 (1932).
46. Note the discussion of this in Jones, The Name of the Game is
Decision-Some Reflections on "Arbitrability" and "Authority" in Labor
Arbitration, 46 TEXAS L. REv. 865, 869-872 (1968). See Belden's Supermarket,
Inc., 179 N.L.R.B. No. 142 (1969), in which the record revealed that for
twelve years the employer paid all employees Christmas bonuses equivalent
to one week's pay. There was no evidence to suggest that the payment of
this Christmas bonus was at any time mentioned in a union contract or
or during any negotiation sessions.
47. 90 S.Ct. 294 (1969). The Court declared that it did not find compelling
the fact that the National Mediation Board had restricted status quo to
conditions covered in agreements. The Court stated that the NMB has no
adjudicatory authority over major disputes, nor has it a mandate to construe
the RLA generally.
48. 90 S.Ct. 294, 296 n.4 (1969).
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ment not covered in their existing collective agreement. How-
ever, the railroad refused to maintain the status quo and, instead,
proceeded with the new assignments. In supporting its action
the railroad asserted that the goal of the status quo provisions
of the Railway Labor Act is to assure only that existing collec-
tive agreements continue to control the parties' rights and duties
during efforts to change those agreements. The railroad argued
that the status quo provisions of the RLA 40 forbid a carrier from
changing rates of pay, rules, or working conditions as expressed
in an agreement.50 Since the labor contract contained nothing to
preclude the railroad from altering its reporting stations, it
could do so unilaterally without abridging section 651 status quo
rights. The Court rejected this contention, stating that section 2
Seventh, which was added to the Act in 1934, does not impose
any status quo duties attendant upon major dispute procedures.
It simply refers to one category in which those guidelines must
be followed. The purpose of section 2 Seventh is to give binding
effect to labor-management contracts and to establish the re-
quirement that these agreements be changed only by the statu-
tory procedure. Following a detailed discussion of the RLA the
court concluded:
"While the quoted language of Section 5, 6 and 10 is not
identical in each case, we believe that the provisions ...
form an integrated, harmonious scheme for preserving the
status quo .... We have stressed that the status quo extends
to those actual, objective working conditions out of which
the dispute arose, and clearly these conditions need not be
covered in an existing agreement. Thus, the mere fact that
the collective agreement before us does not expressly pro-
hibit outlying work assignments would not have barred the
railroad from ordering the assignments that gave rise to
the present dispute if, apart from the agreement, such as-
signments had occurred for a sufficient period of time with
the knowledge and acquiescence of the employees to become
in reality a part of the actual working conditions."52 (Em-
phasis added.)
49. Controlling here is 45 U.S.C. § 152(7) (1964), which provides "No
carrier, its officers, or agents shall change the rates of pay, rules or working
conditions of its employees, as a class, as embodied in agreements except in
the manner prescribed in such agreements or in Section 6 of this Act."
50. 90 S.Ct. 294, 298 (1969).
51. 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1964).
52. 90 S.Ct. 294, 300 (1969).
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Were this all that had been written, comparison of this situation
with the example of the employer's refusal to give the expected
Christmas bonus would present no difficulties. Longstanding
practices not included in a contract do circumscribe the legal
limits of employer action, as evidenced by -the foregoing discus-
sion. Since the employer's consent may be readily implied, the
issue of negotiations never arises. Under section 8 (a) (5) the
employer would have to bargain with the union whose concur-
rence would be necessary under section 8(d), or the employer
would have to follow the procedure outlined in section 8 (d).
The dissenting and concurring opinion, authored by Mr.
Justice Harlan and joined by Chief Justice Burger, agreed with
the majority view that the status-quo provisions of the RLA
were not restricted to conditions expressed in agreements. How-
ever, he stated that he favored a more subjective approach than
that applied by the majority in determining that a section 6
"freeze" is appropriate. He described the method as one in which
it is "necessary to consider not only the duration of the practice
but all the dealings between the parties, as for example, whether
the particular condition has been the subject of prior negotia-
tions."5 3 This would seem to fit in the scheme already established
by the decisions. Therefore, one may ask whether a dissent was
proper. Where then does the majority break new ground? Har-
lan's dissent, urging a more subjective approach, emphasizes the
general principle underlying Mr. Justice Black's opinion for the
majority. Harlan would have remanded the case to the district
court for a determination of whether or not the preponderance
of evidence proved that the employer has agreed to the practice.
The majority was not persuaded by this and held that a section
6 freeze applies when there is an affirmative answer to the test
of whether the dispute grew out of what had "become in reality
a part of the actual working conditions," or the express terms
of the agreement. The "actual working conditions" language
should advise employers that the Court will no longer feel com-
pelled to examine management's past silence and will infer from
it consent to the longstanding practice before enforcing Board
orders to bargain. That the practice exists and is suffered
to remain will probably be sufficient support for a section
53. 90 S.Ct. 294, 304 (1969).
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8(a) (5) unfair labor practice charge despite grumblings by
employers or assertions that it continues only at their pleasure. 54
Such a result poses an even greater threat to management pre-
rogatives than existing benefits clauses and longstanding usages
incorporated into the contract. These practices, not part of the
contract because not agreed on, run counter to the traditional
employer approach stated above that "[t]he powers which man-
agement does not [actively] surrender . ..management neces-
sarily retains .... -55 Further implications of this thesis will be
discussed below with respect to employers' defenses and meth-
ods of avoiding the dilemma.
Employer Defenses
Certainly, the most obvious defense available to the em-
ployer in this area is that the practice which the union alleges
54. Of course, it is not certain that the rationale of the Shoreline case
interpreting the RLA will be carried over to the NLRA, but there appears
nothing substantial to prevent it. The Supreme Court has previously cited
a RLA case for support in a NLRA case. E.g., Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l
Union, 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955), rev'd and remanded per curiam, 350
U.S. 892 (1956), cited Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192
(1944) as authority for reversing the lower court's finding of "no jurisdic-
tion" in a racial discrimination case against the unions. See also Order of
Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342 (1944),
and J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944). There is greater empha-
sis on the status quo provisions of the RLA than there is in § 8(d) of the
NLRA, yet this would not pose any great difficulity for the court analogizing
the Shoreline case to similar, non-railroad cases.
Under both Acts collective bargaining requires an employer and the
union to negotiate on all topics included within wages, hours, and other
conditions of employment. Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152(1) (1958),
and National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964). Negotiating in
good faith is also a requisite in collective bargaining. Although there is
no express statutory RLA provision requiring good faith bargaining, the
courts unfailingly have held that negotiations between railroads and their
employees' representatives must be conducted in good faith. Virginian Ry.
v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937). Since the NLRA collective bar-
gaining provision was held to be derived from and comparable to the pro-
vision found in the RLA, the requirement of good faith has been expressly
included. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33-34, 43-49
(1937). See Weltronic Co. v. NLRB, 73 L.R.R.M. 2014 (1969). The company
was engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of resistance welding
controls with some of this work being performed at the company's Eight
Mile Road plant between 1965 and 1967. In 1967 the company moved its
plant central wiring and electronic assembly work out of the Eight Mile
plant to its new Telegraph Road plant some three miles away. The move
was accomplished without written notice to the union with the result that
no employees were transferred or laid off. Article I, section 4, contained
the management rights clause. The Court held that the company had vio-
lated section 8(a)(5) and (1) by transferring unit work from its Eight Mile
plant to its Telegraph plant without first notifying the union.
55. Cox & Dunlop, The Duty to Bargain Collectively During the Term
of an Existing Agreement, 63 HARv. L. REv. 1097, 1117 (1950).
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has been unilaterally changed is not long-established. This de-
termination would preclude union charges, and the only limita-
tion on the employer would be express contract provisions.
An employer might also urge as a second defense the effect
of a management rights clause, 50 if he had been able to have
such a clause included in the contract. A purpose of such a
clause is to allow the employer to carry out the general opera-
tion of his business and to make limited innovations without vio-
lating sections 8 (a) (5) and 8 (d) where such changes would fall
within the scope of a mandatory collective bargaining subject. The
Board has placed a requirement on this type of contractual
reservation of the right to manage; the clause must be a "clear
and unmistakable waiver."57 In Union Carbide Corp.,15 a NLRB
decision, the employer is engaged in producing carbon and
56. An example of such may be found in Allied Chem. Corp., 151
N.L.R.B. 718, 724 (1965): "It is recognized that all management functions
whether heretofore or hereafter exercised, and regardless of frequency or
infrequency of their exercise, shall remain vested exclusively in the com-
pany. It is expressly recognized that these functions include, but are not
limited to, (1) full and exclusive control of the management and operation
of the plant, (2) the direction and the supervision of the working forces,
(3) the scheduling of production, (4) the right to determine the extent to
which and the means and manner by which the plant and the various de-
partments thereof shall be operated or shut down, (5) the right to introduce
new or improved methods or facilities, (6) the reduction or increase of
working forces or production, and (7) the right to hire, train, suspend,
discipline . . . employees and establish schedule and assign jobs . .. .
Another example may be found in Ador Corp., 150 N.L.R.B. 693, 695 (1968):
"The management of the Company's plant and the direction of its working
forces, including the right to establish new jobs, abolish or change existing
jobs, or increase or decrease the number of jobs, change materials, processes,
products, equipment and operations shall be vested exclusively in the Com-
pany; .... Subject to the provisions of this agreement, the Company shall
have the right to . .. lay off employees because of lack of work or other
legitimate reasons." A management rights clause in a collective agreement
whereby an employer reserved exclusive rights to act unilaterally was not
illegal, and the employer did not violate the Act's good faith bargaining
requirement by insisting, even to the point of impasse, on the Inclusion of
such a clause in the contract. See NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343
U.S. 395 (1952); NLRB v. Lewin-Mathes Co., 285 F.2d 329 (7th Cir. 1960).
57. E.g., Leeds & Northrup Co. v. NLRB, 391 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1968).
In the Allied Chem. Corp., 151 N.L.R.B 718 (1965) case-see note 56 supra
for management rights clause-the employer subcontracted some bargain-
ing-unit work without consulting the union. The Board dismissed the com-
plaint on other grounds and agreed that, although certain of the clause
provisions could be construed to allow unilateral decisions to sub-contract,
the lack of any specific reference to the objectionable activity forestalled
such an interpretation. There was simply no clear and unmistakable waiver.
See also Proctor Mfg. Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 1166 (1961), and The Press Inc., 121
N.L.R.B. 976 (1958). Compare Ador Corp., 150 N.L.R.B. 1658 (1965) (also
noted in note 56 supra), and International Shoe Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 693 (1965),
for instances in which the "clear and unmistakable" waiver requirement
was met by the management rights clause.
58. 72 L.R.R.M. 1150 (1969).
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graphite anodes and electrodes at its West Virginia plant. Al-
though the current contract, which runs three years to 1970,
makes no mention of subcontracting, it does contain the follow-
ing management rights clause: "The company's right to manage
its plant and affairs, to hire, discharge, promote, and direct the
working forces is unqualified as long as this right is not used in
violation of any provisions of this contract."' 9 It had been the past
practice of the employer to subcontract unit work, and the issue
had been raised in past contract negotiations. The last time the
union requested bargaining on the matter was in 1962; no agree-
ment was reached on a proposal to prohibit subcontracting, and
the union dropped the matter. The Board adopted the findings
of the trial examiner holding that not every unilateral subcon-
tracting of unit work was violative of an employer's obligation
under section 8 (a) (5) and that several of the factors present in
the case taken cumulatively persuaded them that the employer
did not violate the Act. Given weight were the facts that there
was a management rights clause, the contract contained a griev-
ance and arbitration procedure, and the union had been unsuc-
cessful in prohibiting subcontracting through negotiations.
The difficulty which these management rights clauses have
in meeting the standard of a clear and unequivocal waiver is
seen in Weltronic Co. v. NLRB60 The Sixth Circuit in inter-
preting a management clause similar to the one found in Union
Carbide Corp. and similar employer conduct held that the com-
pany had the statutory duty to give the union opportunity to
bargain about the unilateral action. It wrote:
"We also agree [with the Board] that the bargaining agree-
ment cannot properly be construed as a relinquishment of
those rights. While the Board is not empowered to adjudi-
cate the rights of parties covered under a collective bar-
gaining agreement, it does have the right to determine by
reference to the agreement whether one of the parties has
59. Id.
60. 73 L.R.R.M. 2014 (1969). See also The Beacon Journal Publishing
Co., 164 N.L.R.B. 734 (1967). The zipper clause read: "This contract is complete
In itself and sets forth all the terms and conditions of the agreement between
the parties hereto." Id. at 736. The Board refused to "infer a union waiver
of its bargaining right as to a particular subject not mentioned in the con-
tract merely because of a broadly worded 'zipper' provision limiting the
employees' terms and conditions of employment to those set forth in the
contract." Id. at 738.
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agreed to relinquish a statutory safeguard .... That is all
the Board did here."61
In addition to the "management" clause is another common
contractual provision-the "waiver" or "scope of agreement"
provision 62 which constitutes a third defense. This clause spe-
cifically waives all rights of the parties to require collective
bargaining over any matter whether or not contained in the
union contract. It has been noted that the management rights
and scope of agreement clauses are quite similar; both literally
are a waiver of the duty to bargain. Their difference lies in the
circumstances which evoke them. 8 Such provisions are often
referred to in shorthand form as "sewing up" or "zipper"
clauses.0 4 Board acceptance of them is unlikely in light of the
principle illustrated in Century Electric Motor Co.0 5 In this case.
the employer was engaged in the manufacture and sale of elec-
tric motors and maintained a plant in Ohio. The plant had been
purchased by the employer from the Tait Manufacturing Com-
pany in 1967. The successor employer paid a Christmas bonus
in that year, according to the formula Tait had used for the
previous nine years, notwithstanding the contract which con-
tained no mention of the bonus but did include a "zipper"
clause. 60 A new collective agreement was signed in the next
year. This contract made no reference to Christmas bonuses and
contained in identical language the "zipper" clause of the pre-
61. Id. at 2016.
62. In many collective bargaining agreements, the waiver of the duty to
bargain is explicitly and elaborately detailed, such as: "The parties acknowl-
edge that during the negotiations which resulted in this agreement each
had the unlimited right and opportunity to make demands and proposals
with respect to a subject or matter not removed by law from the area of
collective bargaining, and that the understandings and agreements arrived
at by the parties after the exercise of that right and opportunity are set
forth in this agreement . . . therefore, the Corporation and the Union for
the life of this Agreement, each voluntarily and unqualifiedly waives the
right, and each agrees that the other shall not be obligated, to bargain col-
lectively with respect to any subject or matter not specifically referred to
or covered in this agreement, even though such subject or matter may not
have been within the knowledge or contemplation of either or both of the
parties at the time that they negotiated or signed this agreement." S.
TORFF, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 61-62 (1953).
63. Note, 41 IND. L. J. 455, 456-458, especially n.9 (1966).
64. Waiver provisions usually take the short form of "zipper" or "sewing
up" clauses. An example of such may be found in Borden Co., 110 N.L.R.B.
802, 805 (1954): "It is understood and agreed that all matters subject to
collective bargaining have been covered in this Agreement and It may not
be opened before 1954 for change in its terms .... "
65. 180 N.L.R.B. No. 174, 73 L.R.R.M. 1307 (1970).
66. 73 L.R.R.M at 1308.
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vious contract. The subject of Christmas bonuses had not been
mentioned during the negotiations for either the 1966 contract
or the 1968 contract.
The employer, without prior notice of the change, unilateral-
ly discontinued the bonus for 1968. After union protest and de-
mand of bargaining on the subject, the employer met with the
union and asserted that he had no obligation to pay the year-end
bonus or even to discuss its discontinuance or suspension.
The Board members found that the employer had violated
sections 8 (a) (5) and (1) by unilaterally discontinuing the 1968
Christmas bonus and by thereafter refusing to negotiate, since
a waiver of right to bargain on a mandatory bargaining subject
must be in clear and unmistakable language, and mere silence
does not constitute effective waiver.
Nevertheless, it is still true that the parties may by express
contract confer on the employer the power of unilateral decision
if it comes within the "clear and unmistakable" requirement, in
which case the procedures of Section 8(d) would have been
satisfied. Such a contractual provision may even involve wages;
and the employer's right to act unilaterally with regard to them
would be founded upon the collective agreement.6 7
Waiver of the right to bargain may be implied by the con-
duct of the union during negotiations. In this instance the em-
ployer might urge that he has relied on statements by the union
and that it would be to his detriment if it were now allowed to
to change. This waiver may arise in cases where there was dis-
cussion of the practice at the bargaining sessions or where abso-
lutely nothing was said about it; but both must meet the "clear
and unmistakable" requirement.""
This standard was used by the Board in supporting its de-
cision in Richland, Inc.6 9 After an election, the union was certi-
fied and began negotiations on a contract. During one of the
bargaining sessions, the union presented to the company a pro-
posed agreement including a clause (Item 36) prohibiting lay-
offs of employees as the result of the introduction of new equip-
ment without prior notice to and negotiations with the union.
67. See NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1966); Leeds
& Northrup Co. v. NLRB, 391 F.2d 874, 877-878 (3d Cir. 1968).
68. Insulating Fabricators, Inc., 144 N.L.R.B. 1325, 1332 (1963).
69. 180 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 73 L.R.R.M. 1017 (1969).
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At a later session the union representative withdrew Item 36
in order to get a first contract settlement. This withdrawal was
preceded by a union inquiry directed to whether there were any
plans of the employer to introduce new automation or remote
control equipment. The reply was that no such changes were
planned for the forseeable future.
Despite this concession the negotiations fell through, and
the employees struck. The company purchased remote control
equipment and in three subsequent negotiation sessions no men-
tion was made of its intent to install such equipment. Following
reinstatement, five engineers were laid-off for the reason that
the employer was "going remote control and automation."
A complaint was filed and the employer contended that
the union had waived its right to notice and to negotiation. The
Board, adopting the findings of the trial examiner, held that the
evidence supported a conclusion contrary to the company's con-
tention:
"A waiver is quite a different matter than the simple with-
drawal of a proposal of a clause for negotiation. The Union
at no time stated it was waiving its right to such a funda-
mental right as the right to bargain about the introduction
of devices which could destroy the very employment of the
members of the bargaining unit.
7 0
The waiver claimed by the employer simply did not meet the
standard, and the NLRB indicated that waivers are not to be
lightly construed, but on the contrary require the most rigorous
of proof. Given the Board distrust of waivers incorporated into
the text of the contract, the standard is even more difficult to
meet in the case of unwritten waivers.
Nevertheless, such a waiver was recognized by the Board
in Murphy Diesel Co.1' as clear and unequivocal. There the
employer had paid annually, by separate check, Christmas
70. 180 N.L.R.B. No. 2 at TXD-17 (1969) (slip decisions).
71. 179 N.L.R.B. No. 27, 72 L.R.R.M. 1309 (1969). see Seattle Dep't Stores
Ass'n, 71 L.R.R.M. 1404 (1969), in which the Board decided the employers'
association did not violate its bargaining duty by unilaterally instituting new
night opening hours. Although the existing contract did not waive specifically
the union's right to bargain over the matter, the contract contained no men-
tion of the subject of night openings. There had been no negotiations con-
cerning establishment of such, and the various member stores, for many




bonuses from 1947 to 1967. The bonus and the amount were not
related to individual employee merit or earnings,7 2 the sole
criteria being whether the business earned a profit during the
year. Since recognition of the union in 1941 the annual bonus
had never been the subject of negotiations or mentioned by the
contracts, and the payments were effected without negotiations,
request of negotiations, or grievances. During late 1967, the
parties began negotiations for a new contract. In December, the
employer advised the union that the Christmas bonus would be
given for 1967 though there would be none the next year unless
there was a profit.
In January, bargaining began on a new contract, and in
February the union's attorney examined the employer's books.
His examination verified the fact that the employer lost money
in 1967 and in January and February of 1968. Although the
subject of the 1968 bonus had not been raised directly during
the negotiations, a member of the union's team commented that
the bonus would probably not be paid. The employer's official
replied that "if financial conditions continued as they had been"
it would be correct to say that "the bonus would not be paid."73
The unit employees did not receive a Christmas bonus in
1968. The Board, in holding that the employer had not violated
section 8(a) (5), wrote:
"In the circumstances of this case, we are satisfied that the
Union was aware of the Respondent's intention not to pay
a bonus in 1968 if its operations did not return a profit dur-
ing that year; that the Union had adequate opportunity to
apprise itself of the status of profit or lack thereof; and that
the Union was afforded every opportunity to bargain about
72. "The question of whether a Christmas bonus, given over a period of
years by an employer to its employees and not negotiated or covered by con-
tract, is embraced within the terms 'wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment' under Section 9(a) and Section 8(a)(5) of the
Act, is neither novel nor a matter of first impression insofar as the Board
and the Courts are concerned . . . .' [I]t was recognized that the payment
of a bonus was a subject as to which an employer was bound to bargain
collectively upon request' . . .Nor is the basis of or method used in com-
puting the bonus, the determining factor in the conclusion as to whether a
Christmas bonus is a bargainable subject ...
"When a matter, such as the instant unit bonus, is within the coverage
of Section 9(a) of the Act, the legal consequence is two-fold, namely, the
employer is obligated to bargain with the Union, upon request, about the
bonus, and the employer is obligated, as a general proposition, to refrain
from acting unilaterally on the bonus . 179 N.L.R.B. No. 27 at TXD-5, 6.
73. 72 L.R.R.M. 1309, 1311.
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elimination of the 1968 bonus during the long negotiations
for a contract which concluded in November 1968 .... -74
Being persuaded by the past practice of the company's uni-
lateral control that was exercised without any remonstrance or
flicker of interest on the part of the union, the Board approved
the unwritten waiver. Apparent acquiescence in the employer's
unilateral action, lack of a proposal by the union during negotia-
tions that an existing benefits clause be adopted, and opportunity
granted the union to explore the bargaining subject and to re-
quest bargaining, provided "the most rigorous of proof" of ef-
fective waiver.
Conclusion
Despite the difficulty of proof, the employer is certainly not
without arguments in defense of his unilateral action, if his
economic strength were sufficient at the outset. However, a
re-evaluation of these arguments is necessary in view of Shore-
line which embraces the area in which either nothing was said
during negotiations about the past practice or the practice was
discussed but allowed to remain as it was. In neither instance,
the court suggests, is it controlling that employer consent was
not obtained nor would it seem to matter if the union impliedly
waived the right to bargain.75 That the practice had occurred
74 179 N.L.R.B. No. 27 at D-1, n.1.
75. The validity of the waiver in Murphy was not based on an interpreta-
tion of any article in the collective agreement. It represents a union-
negotiation waiver and reliance on past practices of the employer. Shell Oil
Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 283 (1964), is an example of a case decided, in great part, on
the issue of union-negotiation waiver but is distinguished from Murphy in
that there was reliance on the interpretation of an available contract article.
In Shell, during the course of negotiations, the parties had forty-seven bar-
gaining sessions with the contracting out of work being one of the chief
matters discussed. Throughout the discussions, the company consistently
maintained that under article XIV ("work within the refinery which could
be performed by employees covered by this agreement, the Company will
• . . [require] the contractor to pay not less than the rates of pay provided
in this agreement for the same character of work." Id. at 284) it had the
right to subcontract without notice to or consultation with the union. The
only restriction recognized by the employer was the "prevailing wage" clause
in the provision. Union efforts failed to secure either complete prohibition
of art. XIV or greater restrictions on it. The new agreement retained art.
XIV without material modification and contained no new restrictions on the
employer's subcontracting practices.
In the Board's view art. XIV was not merely a limitation on subcon-
tractors' wage rates with no bearing upon the Union's bargaining rights.
In the Board's opinion, "its (Art. XIV) terms are reasonably to be construed
as embodying an implicit, yet clear, understanding that, at least with respect
to the Company's continuous practice of contracting out occasional main-
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for a sufficient period of time with the knowledge and approval
of the employees even though combined with a union waiver of
the right to notice and consultation would still result in binding
the employer to maintaining "actual working conditions."
Applying this Shoreline rationale76 to the clear and un-
equivocal union negotiation waiver discussed in Murphy, it
should be concluded that the employer is unable to change
unilaterally the terms of employment in any circumstances
where the employees know of and have acquiesced in the prac-
tice for a sufficient period without specific collective-agreement
permission. Thus negotiations and implied union waiver may be
inconsequential and inutile to the employer as a defense. The
employer who might have relied on the "clear and unmistak-
able" waiver should realize that express contractual terms will
best negate a past practice.
Howard S. Linzy
tenance work, Respondent had the right to act unilaterally without prior
notice or consultation .... In the circumstances, we are persuaded that
Article XIV evidenced a contractual intent that ...Respondent was free
to award occasional maintenance subcontracts without obligation to provide
advance notice or an opportunity to bargain." Id. at 286-87.
76. See note 54 supra.
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